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Bottom-Up or Top-Down? Removing the Privacy Law
Obstacles to Healthcare Reform in the National Healthcare
Crisis
JOHN W. HILL,* ARLEN W. LANGVARDT** & JONATHAN E. RINEHART***
The nation is faced with a healthcare crisis of monumental proportions that
threatens the economic stability of the nation and raises moral issues of healthcare
quality and availability.1 Politicians rant about healthcare reform, but often this ranting
may reflect more political posturing than efficacy in the solutions proposed.2 Amid the
rancor, one of the most underdiscussed facets of the crisis is that of the legal obstacles
that need to be removed if the nation is to enjoy the full benefits of a true national
healthcare system, as opposed to the current patchwork of local systems cobbled
together by a morass of operational and legal cords.3 Indeed, the U.S. healthcare
system has been analogized to a modern airliner flown with biplane controls in terms of
its diagnostic and treatment capabilities versus its administrative and clinical
operations.4 In terms of its cost, politics, quality, and efficiency, healthcare is no longer
a state and local issue but rather a national one,5 and one that threatens the U.S.
economy.6 Continuing with the aircraft analogy, it is as if air traffic is being governed
by state laws—with each state having a somewhat different set of rules—some of
which prohibit flying across state lines. We argue that both the quality of future
treatment and its cost depend to a significant extent upon rationalizing laws that govern
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1. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. GAO-04-793SP, COMPTROLLER
GENERAL’S FORUM: HEALTHCARE 3 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgibin/getrpt?GAO-04-793SP [hereinafter HEALTHCARE FORUM] (stating that the public and private
sectors are facing major challenges with respect to cost, access, and quality of healthcare).
2. See Paul Krugman & Robin Wells, The Healthcare Crisis and What to Do About It,
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 23, 2006, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18802 (book
review).
3. See generally John W. Hill, Arlen W. Langvardt & Anne P. Massey, Law, Information
Technology, and Medical Errors: Toward a National Healthcare Information Network
Approach to Improving Patient Care and Reducing Malpractice Costs, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 159, 236–37 (examining the current state of the national healthcare system and some of
the legal issues attending a move toward a national health information network).
4. See Roy L. Simpson, Medical Errors, Airplanes, and Information Technology, NURSING
MGMT., June 2000, at 14.
5. See Sharon R. Klein & William L. Manning, Telemedicine and the Law, HEALTH L.
RESOURCE, http://www.netreach.net/~wmanning/telmedar.htm. For a discussion of the failure of
the legal and regulatory environment to keep up with changes in distributive medicine, see id.
6. Diana Manos, GAO: Healthcare Costs Threaten to Undo American Economy,
FIN.
NEWS
Jan.
31,
2008,
available
at
HEALTHCARE
http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/printStory.cms?id=7603.
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healthcare. One of the most critical bodies of these laws—because of the tradeoffs
between patients’ rights to privacy and clinical interoperability—is that pertaining to
the privacy of personal healthcare information.7
Current national political policy seems to favor a bottom-up solution in which state
legal regimes gradually evolve to permit some sort of electronically connected national
healthcare network—or perhaps the lesser objective of a collection of loosely linked
local and regional networks. If this national network is to evolve rapidly, a patchwork
of federal and state privacy laws that promise to seriously impede this network must
somehow be harmonized in order to resolve systemic problems related to quality,
inefficiency, and inaccessibility.8 As described in the following part, the U.S.
healthcare system suffers from serious problems related to quality, access, and
affordability, which affect most Americans in one or more ways. Removing the barriers
to a national healthcare network is one of the most important aspects of resolving this
healthcare crisis—hence the need for harmonization of disparate privacy laws. This
suggests the following questions: Is it possible for such harmonization to take place
bottom-up? Conversely, is a top-down solution needed in which a national legal
framework for healthcare is forged, either through preemptive federal legislation or by
providing federal incentives to encourage states to adopt model legislation and
harmonize their disparate privacy laws? We briefly explore these questions, suggesting
possible answers and weighing their potential effectiveness. First, we address the
current state of domestic healthcare with its myriad problems and deficiencies and
consider why there is a need for a national healthcare network together with a
corresponding legal framework that will permit such a network to thrive. Second, we
review some of the more important laws and legal issues that attend privacy law. Third,
we discuss proposed model legislation and its potential efficacy in forging a coherent,
national framework for healthcare information privacy. We conclude by offering
several observations regarding the various prescriptions for rationalizing healthcare
privacy laws.
I. THE STATE OF THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
Constituting over sixteen percent of the nation’s gross domestic product and
representing its largest industry,9 the $1.9 trillion U.S. healthcare system10 is a
contrarian paradox of massive proportions in that the world’s best treatment
capabilities—capabilities growing rapidly with advances in molecular medicine11—are
exacerbating its difficulties with quality, accessibility, and cost.12 Expressed somewhat

7. See Hill et al., supra note 3, at 188–93, 226–27.
8. See id. at 200–01, 230–33. For discussion of the lack of national healthcare information
connectivity and ensuing problems, see id. at 197–200, 202–04.
9. David Stires, Technology Has Transformed the VA, FORTUNE, May 15, 2006, at 131,
available
at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/05/15/8376846/index.htm.
10. Richard Hillestad, James Bigelow, Anthony Bower, Federico Girosi, Robin Meili,
Richard Scoville & Roger Taylor, Can Electronic Medical Record Systems Transform
Healthcare? Potential Health Benefits, Savings, and Costs, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1103, 1103 (2005).
11. See Hill et al., supra note 3, at 161–62, 206–07.
12. E.g., Krugman & Wells, supra note 2; see also David W. Bates, Mark Ebell, Edward
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differently, as healthcare technology becomes better and people live longer and have
more medical issues, the potential for both medical errors and the cost of cutting-edge
treatment increase, making accessibility less affordable.13 The circularity inherent in
this paradox makes finding efficacious solutions to the problem difficult and portends
even more debate among the various players, including politicians, healthcare
providers (HCPs), health insurers, and pharmaceutical companies among others, all of
whom have vested interests of one form or the other as well as ideological biases.14 As
if this were not gloomy enough, problems of circularity extend beyond the bettertreatment-leads-to-more-treatment paradox to more microlevel facets of the crisis. For
example, collection of clinical outcome data is essential for building a high-quality,
efficient healthcare system.15 The difficulty is not just that the mechanisms for
collecting such data are for the most part not in place; it is also that the patchwork of
state healthcare data privacy laws layered on top of the federal Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)16 represent a huge obstacle to
large-scale patient screening and treatment, physician performance, and tracking of
outcomes,17 despite some recent attempts at legal reforms.18
From a quality standpoint, there is near universal agreement that serious problems
exist. In 2000, the Institute of Medicine issued a report indicating that as many as
98,000 patients are killed annually by medical errors,19 and the United States lags
behind some other first-world nations in several health treatment outcome measures.20
Although there is disagreement as to the causes, there is also widespread consensus
that the U.S. healthcare system is inefficient.21 From an information technology
standpoint, the U.S. healthcare industry has been described as “arguably the world’s
largest, most inefficient information enterprise.”22 From an accessibility standpoint,
despite an abundance of political rhetoric,23 there remains high variance in the rates at
Gotlieb, John Zapp & H.C. Mullins, A Proposal for Electronic Medical Records in U.S.
Primary Care, 10 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 1, 4 (2003) (stating that the “unaided human
mind simply cannot process the current volume of clinical data required for practice,” that “[a]s
information becomes obsolete, it is not refreshed, and new knowledge cannot be integrated,”
and that “[t]he advent of genomics will only make this problem worse”).
13. E.g., Krugman & Wells, supra note 2. This contrarian paradox has been described
rather succinctly by two distinguished Harvard professors, one of whom is a former U.S.
Surgeon General: “[I]t was the very progress which physicians had made in science, which
involved them in new difficulties in the practice of their art.” JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI
FEIN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS: HOW WE GOT INTO IT AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET OUT 40
(2005) (citation omitted).
14. Id. at 1, 6–7.
15. HEALTHCARE FORUM, supra note 1, at 20.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to -8 (2000).
17. See Hill et al., supra note 3, at 193, 226–33.
18. See id. at 221–26, 229–35 (detailing the problems that remain after these attempts).
19. INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26, 31 (Linda T.
Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan & Molla S. Donaldson eds., 2000), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309068371/html/R1.html.
20. HEALTHCARE FORUM, supra note 1, at 7.
21. See, e.g., Krugman & Wells, supra note 2.
22. Hillestad et al., supra note 10, at 1103.
23. David J. Brailer, Digital Medicine in the Era of Health Reform, Keynote Address at
Harvard Medical School Seminar: Patient-Centered Computing and eHealth: Transforming
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which geographically diverse patients obtain healthcare, with no adequate clinical
explanation for this variance.24 From a financial perspective, the healthcare crisis is
said to actually be a triple crisis: (1) the unraveling of traditional, employer-based
health insurance; (2) a growing problem in Medicaid, a state-administered, federally
funded healthcare program that provides healthcare for many uninsured patients; and
(3) a federal budget crisis in which healthcare spending is growing faster than per
capita income.25 As employers are increasingly unable or unwilling to fund employersponsored programs, the costs of which are growing faster than corporate profits, more
of the cost of healthcare has fallen upon the government.26 As a result the U.S.
Comptroller General estimates that government healthcare payments as a percentage of
gross domestic product will more than triple by 2070.27
Two important and closely linked keys to healthcare reform are improved clinical
interoperability and health information exchange.28 Many of the current clinical and
administrative processes that characterize healthcare are like cart paths that have been
paved over to make roads.29 Mistake-proofing—“the use of process or design features
to prevent errors or the negative impact of errors”—is an area that shows tremendous
promise in improving healthcare quality and efficiency.30 Although mistake-proofing
can involve quite simple processes, more sophisticated technologies (e.g., bar coding,
computerized physician order entry, and robotic pharmacies) are required to realize the
full potential for reducing medical errors and the growing cost burden of healthcare.31
These technologies, and even more sophisticated ones, must be supported by health
information systems that permit a reasonably free flow of patient information to
HCPs.32 Consequently, such systems are a second key to healthcare reform and an
extension of process improvement. Once processes have been streamlined and mistakeproofed, they should be connected in a manner not unlike the cockpit of a modern jet
fighter with, computer-integrated control system—as opposed to manual biplane
Healthcare Quality, (Mar. 29, 2008) (notes on file with authors).
24. HEALTHCARE FORUM, supra note 1, at 19. For one theory behind this disparity, see id. at
10–11.
25. Krugman & Wells, supra note 2.
26. See HEALTHCARE FORUM, supra note 1, at 6.
27. See id. at 5.
28. See, e.g., Hill et al., supra note 3, at 209 (citing evidence from Evanston Northwestern
Healthcare that improvements in clinical processes and health information technology need to
go hand-in-hand).
29. This was underscored by Ronald W. Dollens, former CEO of Guidant Corp., who
commented that fundamental process change was a prerequisite for healthcare improvement and
successful, large-scale IT implementation within healthcare. Interview with Ronald W. Dollens,
former President and CEO, Guidant Corp., and past Chairman, Healthcare Leadership Council,
in Bloomington, Ind. (Feb. 1, 2006) (notes on file with authors).
30. JOHN GROUT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., AHRQ PUB. NO. 07-0020,
MISTAKE-PROOFING THE DESIGN OF HEALTH CARE PROCESSES 1 (2007).
31. Id. at 15. For extensive examination of the role that enhanced use of electronic medical
records and other significant technologies may play in a new type of medical malpractice
“reform”—a reform that focuses on the reduction of medical errors—see Hill et al., supra note
3, at 165–87, 194–97, 202–10.
32. See Hill et al., supra note 3, at 194–210 (arguing for national health electronic
connectivity); see also GROUT, supra note 30, at 131 (discussing the need to conform to federal
privacy laws in disclosing patient status).
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controls—so that information flows seamlessly among HCPs and computers play a
substantially greater role in aiding the medical treatment processes.33 The penultimate
state of such a system of controls would be a national health information network
(NHIN) in which HCPs are linked electronically, the benefits of which include error
reduction through system safeguards, interstate electronic healthcare, complete patient
health information on demand regardless of location, and intensive, large-scale data
collection that greatly facilitates medical research.34
Among the many factors that complicate healthcare reform are two that bear directly
upon clinical interoperability and health information exchange. The first is the
movement from a patient-centric model of treatment to one that is consumer-centric,35
a dynamic that could impact the balance between patients’ privacy concerns and their
desires to play an active role in managing their health. Much of the public has a deep
yearning to exercise more control over their health and sees healthcare information as
the path that leads to better health.36 This yearning is translating into a desire by
patients to exert more control over treatment and have greater access to information
about healthcare availability, quality, and cost.37 This trend toward consumer-centric
treatment may well lead to a greater interest on the part of consumers in ensuring that
HCPs have the most current and complete personal health information possible, even at
an increased risk of inadvertent disclosure of private information. Underscoring this
trend is a greater willingness on the part of healthcare consumers to travel across state
lines to save money or obtain better quality healthcare and a desire that HCPs exchange
clinical information and provide patients with access to their medical records via the
Internet.38
A second factor that bears upon improved clinical interoperability and health
information exchange is a web of state and federal privacy laws that has evolved in a
rather haphazard fashion. In some cases, these privacy laws require disparate levels of
responsibility and diligence. In other cases, there is an outright conflict. In still others,
they contain vagaries that leave HCPs wondering where permissible boundaries rest.39
These laws are impeding healthcare consumers’ ability to obtain high-quality care at an
affordable cost,40 and their rationalization is a necessary prerequisite for a true national
healthcare system characterized by seamless interoperability and information

33. See Sarah Rubenstein, Next Step Toward Digitized Health Records, WALL ST. J., May 9,
2005, at B1; see also Hill et al., supra note 3, at 162 (discussing the role of computerization in
health informatics and noting that the current state of medical record keeping has been described
as largely a paper-and-pencil operation).
34. See Hill et al., supra note 3, at 204–10.
35. See DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, 2008 SUMMARY OF HEALTH CARE
CONSUMERS:
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
20
(2008),
available
at
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_chs_ConsumerSurveyExecutiveSummary_2002
08.pdf.
36. Brailer, supra note 23.
37. See DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 35, at 20.
38. Id. at 22.
39. See, e.g., Cheryl S. Camin, HIPAA: To Preempt or Not to Preempt? That Is the
Question (Especially in Litigation), ABA HEALTH ESOURCE, Sept. 2005,
http://www.abanet.org/health/esource/vol2no1/camin.html.
40. See Hill et al., supra note 3, at 230–33.
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exchange.41 The next section briefly discusses some of the more important aspects of
federal and state privacy laws as a foundation for a subsequent examination of the
issues that attend their rationalization.
II. LEGAL ISSUES ATTENDING PATIENT PRIVACY: FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
Healthcare providers (HCPs) are generally classified as the legal owners of the
medical records regarding their patients,42 with many states also providing patients a
statutory or common law right of access to the records that contain information about
them.43 The usual status of HCPs as owners of the records, however, does not give
them free rein to disclose the records’ content to third parties. Medical ethics codes
offer general guidance on the disclosure issue by providing that, when a physician
acquires information about a patient, the physician has an ethical duty to avoid
disclosing the information to third parties except when furnishing care to the patient
necessitates disclosure or when disclosure advances important societal interests.44
Although many states have enacted laws that restrict HCPs from revealing the
contents of medical records to third parties,45 the statutes vary concerning the range of
HCPs subject to them,46 the types of disclosures prohibited, and the patient’s private
right of enforcement (if any).47 These helped set the stage for federal action to establish
a national rule, though, as will be seen, the national rule that was adopted does not
necessarily preempt state laws.48
The federal government’s foray into the medical information privacy realm resulted
in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)49 and
regulations promulgated pursuant to it. For the most part, HIPAA delegated to the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) the authority to adopt standards for
HIPAA-specified entities to follow in protecting, using, and disclosing patients’
medical information.50 Congress listed the following entities as subject to the to-bedeveloped HHS standards: “health plan[s],” “health care clearinghouse[s],” and “health

41. Id. at 236–37.
42. JAMES WALKER SMITH, HOSPITAL LIABILITY § 14.04[2] (2005); see JOINT COMM’N ON
ACCREDITATION OF HOSPS., ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 93 (1985).
43. SMITH, supra note 42, § 14.04[2]. The federal Privacy Act speaks to the right of access
issue in a limited sense by establishing that patients may inspect medical records maintained
about them by federal agencies, including federal hospitals. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
44. DEAN M. HARRIS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE LAW AND ETHICS 102, 107
(2d ed. 2003). Hospitals and healthcare workers other than physicians hold this same ethical
obligation. SMITH, supra note 42, § 14.04[1].
45. See HARRIS, supra note 44, at 104.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 104–07; see also Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA
Privacy Rules and the Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 654 (2002).
48. See HARRIS, supra note 44, at 104.
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to -8 (2000).
50. Id. §§ 1320d-1 to -3. In addition, HIPAA directed HHS to develop standards under
which covered entities would be expected to utilize safeguards to preserve the accuracy and
confidentiality of patients’ health information. Id. § 1320d-2(d)(2).
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care provider[s] who transmit[] any health information in electronic form” in
connection with specified financial and administrative transactions.51
After identifying the covered entities and outlining general guidelines, HIPAA
assigned HHS the job of crafting most of the details.52 HHS then promulgated
regulations that, in this Article, will be referred to collectively as the “Privacy Rule.”53
The Privacy Rule establishes the specific obligations imposed on covered entities
concerning the safeguarding of protected health information (PHI). According to the
Privacy Rule, PHI is medical information that is “individually identifiable” as
pertaining to a certain patient.54 “[I]ndividually identifiable information” includes
health information that “(1) is maintained in any form or medium, (2) relates to,
identifies, or could identify the person that the health information concerns, and (3) is
transmitted or maintained by a covered entity.”55
To the greatest extent reasonably possible, covered entities must keep PHI
confidential.56 This general duty notwithstanding, the Privacy Rule recognizes various
purposes that make PHI disclosure lawful if the covered entities comply with a
“minimum necessary” standard when making the disclosure.57 Perhaps most

51. Id. § 1320d-1(a). HIPAA’s health plan definition includes health insurance offered by
private insurers, medical coverage furnished by health maintenance organizations, and
governmental healthcare programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. Id. § 1320d(5). A
healthcare clearinghouse is an entity—public or private—that obtains patients’ medical
information in the course of insurance claims processing or in similar contexts. Id. § 1320d(2);
SMITH, supra note 42, § 14.04[3]. HIPAA gave a somewhat broad definition to healthcare
provider. Any “provider of medical or other health services [as defined in other federal statutes],
and any other person furnishing health care services or supplies” is considered a healthcare
provider for purposes of HIPAA. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(3). This means that physicians, nurses,
dentists, pharmacists, hospitals, and clinics are subject to HIPAA and the related regulations if
those parties “transmit[] any health information in electronic form” in regard to administrative
or financial transactions. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(a).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to -3.
53. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–160.552, 164.102–50164.34 (2007).
54. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
55. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6) (providing definition of individually identifiable
health information). Without question, this definition covers much information typically
contained in medical records. When medical information is not “individually identifiable,” it is
not PHI and thus is not subject to the Privacy Rule’s general prohibition against disclosure. See
45 C.F.R. § 164.501. “De-identification” of medical information—through removal of names,
addresses, telephone numbers, social security numbers, and other facts tending to identify a
particular patient—keeps the information from being PHI. Id. § 164.514; see SMITH, supra note
42, § 14.04[3].
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(2); 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502, 164.514.
57. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502, 164.514. The “minimum necessary” standard receives further
discussion infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. An important related obligation imposed
on covered entities applies to their dealings with “business associates,” which are outside parties
that receive PHI during the performance of important services for covered entities. 45 C.F.R. §
160.103. Accounting, law, and consulting firms would be examples of business associates. See
id.; SMITH, supra note 42, § 14.04[3]. The Privacy Rule provides that a covered entity may
lawfully disclose PHI to a business associate only if the covered entity receives satisfactory
written assurances that the business associate will safeguard the information. 45 C.F.R. §
164.502(e). This obligation applies regardless of whether the disclosure required the patient’s
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importantly, a covered entity’s disclosure of PHI is generally permissible without any
need to obtain the patient’s consent if the disclosure is for purposes of “treatment,
payment, or healthcare operations.”58 HCPs, health plans, and healthcare
clearinghouses thus have significant latitude to disclose PHI during key day-to-day
operations.59 The Privacy Rule recognizes a number of other purposes for which
covered entities may disclose PHI without first allowing the patient a chance to
object.60 In other instances, however, the patient must provide consent before
disclosure of PHI may lawfully occur.61
If a covered entity discloses PHI for a permissible purpose, the entity must also
satisfy the “minimum necessary” standard, which limits the amount of information that
may be disclosed.62 The amount of PHI disclosed must not exceed the amount
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the disclosure. Therefore, the
patient’s full medical record may not be disclosed if only certain information in the
record pertains to the purpose of the disclosure.63
To increase patients’ awareness of their HIPAA rights, the Privacy Rule requires
covered entities to furnish patients a written notice of those rights.64 The notice must
mention the previously described instances in which their PHI may be disclosed—not
only those instances in which the patient’s consent is necessary, but also those in which

consent or was for a purpose that eliminated the need for the patient’s consent. See id. In
addition, such assurances are necessary if the business associate is authorized to receive or
create PHI on the covered entity’s behalf. Id. § 164.502(e)(1). If a covered entity acquires
knowledge that a business associate has violated the privacy-preservation obligation on a
repeated basis, the covered entity must remedy the violations or sever ties with the business
associate. Id. § 164.504(e)(1)(ii).
58. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506. The Privacy Rule extends different treatment to
psychotherapy notes, however. If the PHI includes psychotherapy notes, the patient must
provide consent in order for the covered entity to disclose the notes lawfully—even if the
disclosure would be for the otherwise permissible purposes of treatment, payment, or healthcare
operations. Id. § 164.508.
59. See id. § 164.506.
60. See id. § 164.512. These purposes are: to make disclosures required by law; to further
public health activities such as compiling records regarding deaths, births, and disease incidents;
to provide information about abuse or domestic violence victims; to aid in health oversight
activities; to fulfill duties in legal proceedings; to further law enforcement purposes; to provide
information about deceased persons; to assist with organ donation programs; to advance
research purposes; to guard against significant threats to public health or safety; to aid military
operations and other specialized government functions; and to provide information relevant to
workers’ compensation matters. Id. § 164.512(a)(l).
61. Id. § 164.510. If a covered entity will be disclosing PHI for purposes other than those
noted in this section of the Article, patient consent will normally be required. See id. §
164.502(a).
62. Id. § 164.502(b); see also SMITH, supra note 42, § 14.04[3][c]. The “minimum
necessary” standard controls regardless of whether the disclosure is one for which the patient’s
consent is required or, instead, is one for which the Privacy Rule eliminates the need for the
patient’s consent. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502.
63. SMITH, supra note 42, § 14.04[3][c]. The Privacy Rule underscores the importance of
the “minimum necessary” standard by instructing covered entities to develop standardimplementing policies and procedures. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(d).
64. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520.
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the patient’s approval is not a prerequisite.65 The Privacy Rule further requires covered
entities to inform the patient of her right to request that her PHI not be disclosed for
certain purposes and in particular settings. “Request” is a key word here, because a
covered entity need not honor the patient’s nondisclosure request if the Privacy Rule
otherwise allows the making of such a disclosure.66
Under the Privacy Rule, patients have a right of access to their PHI—a right that
includes an entitlement to inspect and copy a “designated record set.”67 Designated
record set is defined as a group of “medical records and billing records about
individuals maintained by or for a covered healthcare provider[,]” a health plan’s
“enrollment, payment, claims adjudication, and case or medical management records
systems[,]” or records “[u]sed . . . by or for the covered entity to make decisions about
individuals.”68
Although patients have substantial rights under HIPAA and the Privacy Rule,
patients cannot sue covered entities that commit violations. Instead, HHS and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) have enforcement authority.69 Patients may complain
about alleged violations to HHS, which may then investigate and initiate civil
administrative proceedings if they seem warranted.70 The Privacy Rule provides HHS a
power it has utilized with frequency: the power to resolve complaints informally. In
informal resolutions, HHS obtains assurances from the covered entity that the alleged
problem will be resolved and not repeated.71 If the case goes through full
administrative proceedings72 and violations are found, the violators may be assessed
civil penalties of not more than $100 per violation.73 Even when a violation is proven,

65. Id. The notice must also inform the patient of her right to inspect her PHI and request
amendments to it or corrections in it. The patient must be informed in the notice that she may
request an accounting of instances in which her PHI was disclosed to third parties. Id. §§
164.520(b), 164.528; see id. §§ 164.524, 164.526; SMITH, supra note 42, § 14.04[3][c][vi]. In
addition, the notice must inform patients of how they may lodge complaints about PHI
disclosures that they believe were improper. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520(b)(1)(vi). Covered entities
must designate a person to receive patients’ complaints about possible violations and must
document all such complaints. Id. § 164.530(a)(1)(ii). In addition, covered entities must
designate a privacy officer who oversees the entity’s policies and procedures for maintaining
confidentiality of PHI. Id. § 164.530(a)(1)(i). HHS has also adopted related regulations that
require covered entities to utilize specific security measures to safeguard PHI when it is
electronically transmitted and used. See id. §§ 164.306, 164.308, 164.312.
66. 45 C.F.R. § 164.522; see also id. § 164.506.
67. Id. § 164.524(a).
68. Id. § 164.501. Electronic medical records systems, of course, are subject to the patient’s
right of access to the same extent that paper records systems are. See id.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2000); 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a).
70. 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a), (c).
71. See id. §§ 160.312, 160.416; see also Rob Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines,
WASH. POST, June 5, 2006, at A1 (noting that during the first three years of privacy protections
put in place by HIPAA and the Privacy Rule (the period of 2003 through 2006), HHS almost
always engaged in informal resolution when patients filed grievances).
72. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.300–160.316, 160.400–160.426.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a); 45 C.F.R. § 160.404(b)(1)(i). HIPAA and the Privacy Rule
also establish a $25,000 cap on the total civil penalties imposed on a covered entity for all of its
violations of the same requirement or prohibition during the same calendar year. 42 U.S.C. §
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however, HHS has the authority to waive the civil penalty.74 Besides outlining the
potential civil consequences for violations of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule, HIPAA
contains a criminal liability provision that outlaws the knowing disclosure or
acquisition of individually identifiable health information in violation of the statute and
the Privacy Rule.75
Since the Privacy Rule took effect, the civil and criminal penalties established in
HIPAA and detailed in the Privacy Rule have essentially gone unused. As of June
2006, HHS had imposed no civil penalties.76 As to roughly 14,000 complaints made by
patients, HHS found no violation, resolved the matter informally, or found a violation
but declined to impose a civil penalty.77 HHS’s clear preference thus far has been to
resolve complaints of civil violations informally and to encourage voluntary
compliance on the part of covered entities.78 Concerning HIPAA’s criminal provision,
little activity has occurred. Although HHS had referred approximately 300 cases to the
DOJ for possible criminal prosecution as of June 2006, the DOJ had instituted only
two actual prosecutions.79
As might be expected, covered entities have preferred HHS’s strategy of
encouraging voluntary compliance to holding full administrative proceedings and
imposing civil penalties. Privacy advocates, however, have reacted differently, seeing
HHS’s disinclination to impose civil penalties as a signal to covered entities that they
can take a lax approach to fulfilling the duties established in HIPAA and the Privacy
Rule.80 If the use of electronic medical records becomes more prevalent, this debate
would seem likely to assume added significance.
HIPAA and the Privacy Rule generally supersede state laws that directly contradict
the federal requirements for safeguarding PHI81 or that furnish less protection for

1320d-5(a); 45 C.F.R. § 160.404(b)(1)(ii).
74. 45 C.F.R. § 160.412. HIPAA provides that no civil penalty is to be imposed if a
criminal violation is established. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(b). The criminal liability provision, id. §
1320d-6, will be discussed below. See infra note 75. HIPAA also provides that no civil penalty
is to be imposed if the violator neither knew, nor had reason to know, of the violation, assuming
the failure to comply with the Privacy Rule either stemmed from “reasonable cause and not . . .
willful neglect” or was corrected promptly by the violator. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(b).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a). A criminal violation may lead to a fine of up to $50,000 and a
maximum of one year of imprisonment. If the violation consists of disclosing or obtaining
individually identifiable health information “under false pretenses,” the maximum fine and term
of imprisonment increase to $100,000 and five years, respectively. Id. § 1320d-6(b). The
maximum fine increases to $250,000 and the maximum term of imprisonment increases to ten
years if the offense is “committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use” individually identifiable
health information “for commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm.” Id.
76. Stein, supra note 71.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(1) (2000); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2007). For instance, the
Privacy Rule requires that each covered entity provide its patients a notice of their rights under
HIPAA and the Privacy Rule. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520; see supra text accompanying notes 64–65.
A state law purporting to eliminate this notice requirement would directly contradict the Privacy
Rule and would therefore be preempted. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(1); see also 45 C.F.R. §
160.203.
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patients’ privacy interests than the federal rules offer.82 If state laws protect patients’
privacy interests to a greater extent than do HIPAA and the Privacy Rule, there is no
federal preemption of the state provisions.83 In this sense, HIPAA and the Privacy Rule
establish a privacy floor for the states; states are free to build upon it but the floor
remains.84 States’ exercises of this latitude to provide greater privacy protections have
led to a messy legal environment in which differing privacy-preservation obligations
exist.85 As will be seen, the no-preemption rule currently applicable to more protective
state-mandated privacy schemes may need to be reconsidered in order to keep privacy
concerns, their importance notwithstanding, from becoming an undue barrier to
nationwide adoption and clinical interoperability of medical-error-reducing
information technology.86
Examples of more protective—and hence non-preempted—state privacy rules
should be instructive. For instance, in setting the rules concerning HCPs’ disclosures of
patients’ protected medical information, various states’ laws are more restrictive87 than
the federal Privacy Rule’s provision allowing disclosure without the patient’s consent
if the disclosure is for purposes of “treatment, payment, or healthcare operations.”88
Where state laws are more restrictive regarding disclosure, they typically require
patient consent for some treatment-related disclosures and limit the range of HCPs to
whom disclosure may be made without patient consent.89 Efforts to move toward
nationwide use of electronic medical records and related information technology may
be impeded by the present requirement that HCPs tailor their operations to comply
with some states’ differing disclosure rules, as opposed to a single federal standard.90
Numerous states’ medical privacy laws include significant, though not necessarily
identical, restrictions on HCPs’ ability to disclose patients’ health information insofar

82. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)–(b); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203. However, if HHS concludes that
certain state laws prevent fraud or serve as key components of the state’s insurance regulation
system, the federal provisions do not preempt the state laws. Neither is there preemption of state
laws dealing with controlled substances and with the reporting of injuries, diseases, other public
health matters, and vital statistics. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2), (b); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203. The
same is true of state standards and information-gathering efforts that relate to audits, licensure,
or certification. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2), (b); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2), (b); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203.
84. Joy L. Pritts, Altered States: State Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the Federal
Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 325, 343 (2002); see also Michael
D. Greenberg & M. Susan Ridgely, Patient Identifiers and the National Health Information
Network: Debunking a False Front in the Privacy Wars, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 31, 44–
45 (2008); Grace Ko, Partial Preemption Under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 497, 503–04 (2006).
85. Greenberg & Ridgely, supra note 84, at 44–45; Ko, supra note 84, at 506–10.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 90, 95–98, 151–63.
87. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.3025 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 465.017 (West
2007); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64B16-28.130 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-40 (1995);
N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. PH. § 501.01(b)(9) (2005).
88. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a); see supra text accompanying notes 58–59.
89. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.3025; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 465.017; FLA. ADMIN. CODE
ANN. r. 64B16-28.130; GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-40; N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. PH. §
501.01(b)(9).
90. See Hill et al., supra note 3, at 231.
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as it refers to the patient’s having contracted HIV status or other communicable
diseases of a serious nature.91 The federal Privacy Rule, on the other hand, does not
treat HIV or communicable disease information differently from other information in
terms of healthcare providers’ ability to disclose.92 The state laws are therefore more
protective of patient privacy in this respect and would not be preempted by HIPAA and
the Privacy Rule.93 The complying-with-different-standards problem again exists
regarding such information and further serves as an example of how the current
approach of treating HIPAA and the Privacy Rule as establishing a privacy floor may
hinder efforts to develop a national healthcare information network.94
This example, however, should not minimize the importance of the patient privacy
interests that are at stake. Indeed, the particular sensitivity of such information may
make a rule that severely restricts disclosure especially appropriate. But if a special
restriction on disclosure of HIV or other communicable diseases information is
warranted, adding that special restriction to the federal Privacy Rule—and having one
national standard—seems preferable to having a patchwork quilt of state restrictions
featuring varying particulars.95
Whenever non-preempted state law provisions on medical information privacy
differ, they hold the potential for creating confusion and potentially troublesome
conflict-of-laws issues. If the patient and her primary care physician are located in a
state where her medical record was created, but the primary care physician consults
with a specialist in another state, and that specialist in turn consults with an additional
specialist in yet another state, which state’s law controls in regard to disclosures if the
states’ laws differ?96 Instead of HCPs having to worry about such questions and about
potential liability for noncompliance with the particular state law deemed controlling,97
a single nationwide standard sufficiently protective of patients’ privacy interests would
be more consistent with the realities and needs of modern-day healthcare operations.98

91. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-47 (1995); IND. CODE § 16-41-8-1 (2008); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 191.656 (2004); see also Ko, supra note 84, at 506, 523.
92. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506.
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2), (b) (2000); see also 45 C.F.R. 160.203.
94. See Hill et al., supra note 3, at 230–31.
95. See id.
96. See Greenberg & Ridgely, supra note 84, at 45–46.
97. Liability for noncompliance may sometimes be a serious issue under state law, with
various states allowing a private right of action to enforce violations of medical privacy
restrictions. E.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-4 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1504 (2006);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.02.170 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-2-616 (2007); see also
Pritts, supra note 84, at 338. In contrast, there is no private right of action regarding violations
of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6; 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a). As noted earlier,
the federal government has thus far tended to take a low-key, settlement-oriented approach in
handling violations of the Privacy Rule. See supra text accompanying notes 69–80.
Accordingly, an alleged medical privacy violation that might not lead to adverse consequences
for an HCP under federal law or that of most states might trigger patient-instituted litigation in
certain states. For reasons of predictability and efficiency, one national rule—either no private
right of action or a suitably defined private right—would seem preferable if a national healthcare
information network is to become a reality.
98. See Hill et al., supra note 3, at 213. The multi-state scenario commented on in the text
suggests another issue that is not patient privacy-related but stands as an impediment to a

2009]

REMOVING OBSTACLES TO HEALTH CARE REFORM

35

As the foregoing discussion suggests, medical information privacy law has become
a federal-state hybrid with troublesome inconsistencies. In the following section, we
examine and evaluate previous efforts to harmonize the states’ attempts to balance
patients’ privacy interests against HCPs’ need to use and disclose patients’ medical
information.
III. PAST EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH PRIVACY LAW CONFLICTS
While providing sufficient flexibility to allow system design of effective network
architectures, privacy law must concurrently do a reasonable job of protecting patients
from privacy invasion.99 The improper disclosure of health-related information
potentially carries more serious consequences than the inadvertent disclosure of many
other types of information, as evidenced by the fears of many patients of having their
health information compromised100—and with good reason.101 For example, disclosure
of an embarrassing disease or disclosure of a mental health illness could unfairly
stigmatize an individual.102 Consequently, privacy laws must be written with patients as
a primary concern; but, while strong privacy laws limiting access to this information
may comfort patients, care must also be taken to not sacrifice interoperability and
information exchange in such a way that treatment is degraded.103 Effective privacy
laws must therefore balance these competing interests.104
Substantial efforts have been made toward laying a framework for harmonizing
privacy laws. One initiative is the Model State Public Health Privacy Act (“Model
Privacy Act”) drafted by the Privacy Law Advisory Committee. This model act sets out
national healthcare information network: the state-by-state licensing of physicians. Given that
HCPs who may need to work cooperatively are these days often located in different states, a
scheme of multi-state or national licensing of physicians would likely be superior to the current
licensing scheme and the geographic restrictions it places on physicians’ ability to practice. See
id.
99. Vivying S.Y. Cheng & Patrick C.K. Hung, Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Compliant Access Control Model for Web Services, 1 INT’L. J.
HEALTHCARE INFO. SYS. & INFORMATICS 22, 26 (2006).
100. Andis Robeznieks, Privacy Fear Factor Arises, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Nov. 14, 2005,
at 6; see also Kate Ackley, Privacy Groups Wary of Health IT Bill, ROLL CALL, June 19, 2006,
at 11.
101. See, e.g., Anne Zieger, Seattle Health System Will Pay $100K HIPAA Fine,
FIERCEHEALTHIT, July 18, 2008, http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/story/seattle-health-systemwill-pay-100k-hipaa-fine/2008-07-18; WellPoint Data May Have Been Compromised,
FIERCEHEALTHIT, Apr. 21, 2008, http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/wellpoint-data-may-havebeen-compromised/2008-04-21; U.S. Hospitals Have Security “Blind Spot,” FIERCEHEALTHIT,
Apr. 14, 2008, http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/u.s.-hospitals-have-security-blind-spot/2008-04-14.
102. See Robert Hanscom, Panel Discussion Remarks, Legal Worries: Clinical Data Sharing,
Harvard Medical School Seminar: Patient-Centered Computing and eHealth: State of the Field
(Apr. 28-30, 2006) (notes on file with authors) (some patients do not want other providers to see
their entire medical histories).
103. See generally MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH PRIVACY ACT (1999), available at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ResourcesPDFs/modelprivact.pdf.
104. Nancy Vogt, HIPAA and the Legal Electronic Health Record, J. HEALTH CARE
COMPLIANCE, Nov.–Dec. 2005, at 43, 81; see Interoperability Clashes with Privacy in Health IT
System Development, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Jul. 28, 2005 (on file with authors).
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ideal standards for protecting PHI.105 The second initiative, the Turning Point Model
State Public Health Act (“Turning Point Act”), borrows heavily from the Model
Privacy Act in fashioning a more comprehensive model statute that addresses larger
strategic issues in order to help coordinate state-based initiatives for developing public
health infrastructure, fostering relationships between the public and private sector,
determining the powers of public health agencies, and developing strategies for
handling emergencies.106 The Model Privacy Act and the Turning Point Act might
therefore inform legislators and regulators and be guides for privacy protections.
Any model legislation should accomplish the following goals. First, a model law
should provide a framework that promotes public confidence in a national healthcare
information network.107 Lack of public trust will undermine the effectiveness of a
national healthcare network because some individuals may decide to avoid treatment,
research, testing, or other activities that involve the collection of sensitive personal
data.108 Model legislation should inspire confidence in individuals that their most
personal information will be reasonably protected from breaches, compromised data,
or theft. Additionally, privacy laws should provide the necessary incentives for
healthcare organizations to adopt new technologies to improve the quality and
efficiency of healthcare.109
The two model laws embrace these principles in maintaining that the acquisition of
PHI begins with a legitimate public health purpose.110 In order to acquire PHI, the
acquisition should be directly related to this purpose and should be reasonably likely to
achieve it.111 If a healthcare organization can achieve that legitimate purpose with nonidentifiable information, then it should defer to that source, only acquiring PHI as a
secondary option.112 Additionally, the model laws would require transparency and

105. MODEL
STATE
PUB.
HEALTH
PRIVACY
ACT,
available
at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ResourcesPDFs/modelprivact.pdf.
106. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT, prefatory notes (2003), available at
http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dph/improving/turningpoint/PDFs/MSPHAweb.pdf.
107. See generally Activities of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Technology, Innovation, and
Competitiveness of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 110th Cong.
(2005), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/t050630a.html (statement of David Brailer,
National Coordinator for Health Information Technology); Robert Cunningham, Action
Through Collaboration: A Conversation with David Brailer, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1150, 1156–57
(2005); Brailer, supra note 23.
108. COMM. ON MAINTAINING PRIVACY AND SEC. IN HEALTH CARE APPLICATIONS OF THE
NAT’L INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FOR THE RECORD: PROTECTING
ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION 2 (1997) [hereinafter FOR THE RECORD]; see also Lawrence
O. Gostin, James G. Hodge, Jr. & Ronald O. Valdiserri, Informational Privacy and the Public’s
Health: The Model State Public Health Privacy Act, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 1388, 1388 (2001).
109. FOR THE RECORD, supra note 108, at 2.
110. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-101[a]; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 2-101[a].
111. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-101[a](1)–(2); MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 2-101[a](1)–(2).
112. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-101[a](3); MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 2-101[a](3).
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disclosure. Healthcare organizations cannot surreptitiously acquire PHI,113 and they
must publicly disclose their reasons and intentions for acquiring that information.114
Finally, the model laws prohibit one public healthcare organization from obtaining data
from another unless the acquisition meets the model laws’ acquisition standards.115
Consequently, these laws represent a laudable step in enhancing protection of PHI in
various ways. At the same time, however, the restrictions on information transfers
between HCPs represent an obvious barrier to large-scale-network system
interoperability and information exchange.
In addition to circumscribing when HCPs may acquire PHI, effective privacy laws
should define how HCPs use this information after its acquisition. A general principle
embodied in the model statutes is that PHI’s use should be directly related to the reason
for which it was acquired.116 For example, the model statutes generally allow the use of
PHI for research purposes,117 but prohibit its commercial use.118 They also define the
scope of how health organizations can use the information, and typically restrict the use
to the minimum level needed to reasonably accomplish the legitimate purpose.119
Finally, under the model statutes, organizations must expunge protected information
when it is no longer useful in furthering the purpose for which it was acquired.120
The foregoing provisions of the model statutes are designed to protect how HCPs
acquire and use PHI, but once these organizations have acquired and are using PHI, to
whom may it be disclosed? It is this area of disclosure—defining the scope of
disclosure and the circumstances permitting disclosure—that promises to be most
contentious. Generally, privacy laws recognize that PHI is private and, therefore,
prohibit any disclosure unless there is a statutory exception.121 The most notable
exception involves individual consent. Patients may opt to provide their written
consent to allow for certain disclosures.122 Additionally, the model statutes allow for
disclosures in emergency situations or to comply with the law.123 Overwhelmingly,

113. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-101[a]; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 2-101[b].
114. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-101[b]; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 2-101[c].
115. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-101[c]; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 2-102.
116. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-102[a]; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 3-101[a].
117. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-102[f]; MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH
PRIVACY ACT § 3-101[c].
118. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-102[e]; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 3-103.
119. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-102[c]; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 3-102[b].
120. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-102[g]; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 3-104.
121. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-103[a]; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 4-101.
122. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-103[c]; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT §§ 4-101 to -102.
123. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-103[d]–[e]; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT §§ 4-104 to -105.
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however, the model statutes attempt to limit how organizations share personal
information with outside parties, despite the fact that access to a large national
database containing data and information about millions of patients would greatly
facilitate medical research.124
Further, it is not clear that tight restrictions on disclosure, especially restrictions that
differ across jurisdictions, always benefit the individual patient because such
restrictions could become a barrier to clinical interoperability at a time when the
patient desperately needs care.125 Consider, for example, a situation in which a patient
has previously signed a written consent form in her home state to permit disclosure of
certain personal health information. Then the patient travels out of state and is injured,
necessitating treatment. The out-of-state HCP is required by state law to use only a
form approved by that state. Does the patient need to offer his or her consent again due
to legal incompatibility?126 What if the patient is incapacitated at the time? Obviously,
as suggested by the model statutes, privacy laws should contain provisions for transfer
of patient information in emergencies; however, interstate clinical interoperability
would be enhanced by a common, categorical consent instead of requiring point-ofcare determination on a case-by-case basis.127 This raises the question of whether
categorical consent should be allowed, or whether legislation should follow the model
codes, which generally proscribe it.128 How should the law handle the balance between
protection of patient privacy and the speed of care delivery? Should the desires for
privacy by some outweigh the quality of healthcare for others?
Consider further the issue of expunging personal health information that is no
longer needed. The provisions in the Turning Point and Model Privacy Acts that
require expunging data that no longer furthers the purpose for which it was acquired129
may be ideal for protecting PHI because privacy is better protected when personal data
resides on the fewest possible number of servers.130 What is uncertain, however, is

124. See, e.g., David K. Ahern, Jenifer M. Kreslake & Judith M. Phalen, What Is e-Health
(6):Perspectives on the Evolution of eHealth Research, J. MED. INTERNET RES., Jan.–Mar. 2006;
William T. Lester, Richard W. Grant, G. Octo Barnett & Henry C. Chueh, Randomized
Controlled Trial of an Informatics-Based Intervention to Increase Statin Prescription for
Secondary Prevention of Coronary Disease, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 22, 28 (2005); Blackford
Middleton, Patricia F. Brennan & Gregory F. Cooper, Accelerating U.S. EHR Adoption: How to
Get There From Here: Recommendations Based on the 2004 ACMI Retreat, 12 J. AM. MED.
INFORMATICS ASS’N 13, 13–15 (2005).
125. John W. Hill & Phillip Powell, The National Healthcare Crisis:Is eHealth a Key
Solution?, BUS. HORIZONS (forthcoming 2008) (article on file with authors).
126. See FOUND. OF RESEARCH & EDUC. OF AM. HEALTH INFO. MGMT. ASS’N, FINAL REPORT
PART II: COORDINATING POLICIES THAT IMPACT ACCESS, USE, AND CONTROL OF HEALTH
INFORMATION
16–30
(2008),
available
at
http://www.slhie.org/Docs/SLHIE_Final_Report_Part11.11.pdf.
127. For discussion of a scenario involving the transfer of medical information in emergency
cases, see Hill & Powell, supra note 125.
128. See TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-103; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 4-102 cmt. (“General authorization for the release of medical records is
insufficient to authorize the disclosure of protected health information.”).
129. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-102[g]; MODEL STATE PUB.
HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 3-104.
130. The Model Privacy Act “rejects the view that there is an inherent value to having

2009]

REMOVING OBSTACLES TO HEALTH CARE REFORM

39

under what circumstances privacy laws will permit storage, even temporary storage.131
Further, who determines when health information is no longer needed? Even though
health information is not needed at the moment, who decides that a need may not arise
in the future? On a large scale, how will healthcare organizations possessing almost
innumerable patient records (containing information that to a significant extent may be
idiosyncratic) police outdated information on an efficient basis? It seems likely that
expunging initiatives will devolve into arbitrary rules, such as expunging records that
have gone for some specified time period without being accessed. Imagine, though, a
situation in which an emergency patient is rushed to a healthcare facility five years
after her records were last accessed, only to discover that her records have been
expunged without her knowledge because of lapsed time. Lawmakers need to
recognize that personal health information is dynamic and that privacy laws need to be
flexible enough to handle the myriad of unique issues that this information presents as
it flows throughout the healthcare system—not only among units of a single healthcare
organization, but also among providers, insurers, regulators, and any other entity with
access to this information.132
There are numerous other questions that arise from the clash of vertically and
horizontally incongruous privacy laws. These questions range from seemingly trivial
(for example, will cookies be prohibited?) to more serious issues, such as whether
software functionality may be degraded by the nonavailability of data that has been
expunged by law (as might be the case, for example, when patient baseline data are
needed to establish a trend). The model statutes also distinguish between the functions
of data acquisition, use, disclosure, and storage,133 each of which presents its own array
of subissues and concerns, many of which are unresolved.134
A general principle embodied in the model statutes is that patients should be able to
limit who has access to and control of their information, raising questions about
authentication—in essence, the assurance that only those individuals who need access
to the data are able to access the data.135 Overly rigid rules for access will inhibit
ongoing interoperability. Consider the case of a patient treated for mental illness.
Obviously, such information is highly sensitive, and under some conditions it may be
unnecessary for a particular treating physician to know that the patient is being treated
by another clinician for a mental illness. What if a situation arises, however, in which
an emergent physical condition is linked to the mental illness? If the treating physician
was previously unaware of the mental illness because of restrictions on access to the
identifiable information.” MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 3-104 cmt.
131. Cf. HEALTH INFO. PROT. TASKFORCE, REPORT FROM HEALTH INFORMATION PROTECTION
TASKFORCE TO STATE ALLIANCE FOR E-HEALTH 13–14 (2007), available at
http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0708EHEALTHREPORT.PDF (stating that privacy and security
policies should be developed in concert with technology, and one consideration in such an
analysis is storage—how does the software store the data and what is the purpose and use of the
stored data?).
132. Healthcare information could flow between the doctors and nurses; among the
emergency, clinical, or outpatient divisions; or even between the healthcare organization and
third parties. FOR THE RECORD, supra note 108, at 2–4.
133. See MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH PRIVACY ACT.
134. See generally id.
135. Both statutes treat health information as nonpublic information unless the patient
consents. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-103[a]–[d] (2003); MODEL STATE
PUB. HEALTH PRIVACY ACT § 4-101.
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patient’s records, how will she become aware? Further, where do the lines of legal
responsibility rest for making such need-to-know determinations and informing a
treating physician, and who deems a mentally ill patient capable of making such a
determination for herself?
As previously stated, clinical interoperability is closely linked to electronic storage
and transmission of patient information. This raises the question of whether patients
should be compelled to participate in a NHIN.136 While some maintain that patients
should not be forced to participate in an electronic healthcare system because of the
perceived risks to patient privacy,137 others maintain that patients who opt out of such a
system would raise the costs for all, as well as the risks for themselves.138 It remains to
be seen how this knotty issue will be resolved.
The foregoing discussion suggests four points. First, although there is evidence that
the model statutes have influenced some state legislatures, lawmakers should be
informed by them in forging future laws.139 This will engender the systemic
transparency necessary to inspire adequate patient confidence in the network and
thereby encourage use of any NHIN. That is, individuals should understand the
circumstances and the scope of how the health organizations will acquire, use, disclose,
and store their personal information. Given the highly diverse nature of healthcare
services consumers—representing all ages, levels of educational attainment, and
socioeconomic backgrounds—it seems Pollyannaish to believe that such understanding
will be universal.
Second, the model privacy laws seemingly understand the nature of healthcare
information well. Privacy laws should consider how entities acquire and use data so
that data acquisition and use are reasonably tethered to the stated purpose for acquiring
the information.140 Once the information is acquired, organizations should take steps to
ensure that it is not irresponsibly disclosed and is protected from security threats.141
The model statutes appear to be more accommodative of some of the nuances inherent
in PHI (for example, protecting against disclosure of HIV or other communicable
diseases) than HIPAA. In some ways, these models represent general ideals for
protecting privacy and are an important step toward reducing conflicts among the
patchwork of federal and state privacy laws that impede the information exchange
critical to clinical interoperability.142 Lawmakers need to go beyond general ideals and
recognize that effective privacy laws are dependent not only on legal reform, but also

136. See Electronic Health Records and the National Health Information Network: Patient
Choice, Privacy, and Security in Digitized Environments Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and
Confidentiality of the National Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics (2005) (statement of Pam
Dixon,
Executive
Director,
World
Privacy
Forum),
available
at
http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/testimony/CVHStestimony_092005.html.
137. See Gostin et al., supra note 108, at 1388–90.
138. See, e.g., Hill et al., supra note 3, at 233 & n.525.
139. See generally TURNING POINT, TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HEALTH STATE BY STATE,
available
at
http://www.turningpointprogram.org/toolkit/pdf/TP_state_booklet.pdf
(summarizing the various state programs).
140. See Hill et al., supra note 3, at 188–93 (discussing the implementation of the HIPAA
and the Privacy Rule promulgated by HHS).
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., Camin, supra note 39.
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on support activities—such as training, improved infrastructure for privacy
surveillance, and health privacy education—that should supplement legal reform.143
Third, the model laws seemingly do not resolve information exchange conflicts at
the clinical level particularly well; nor do they create real incentives to dismantle
interstate barriers that have been erected by state legislatures passing disparate privacy
laws that are more restrictive than either those contemplated in the HIPAA Privacy
Rule or the model statutes. As noted in previous sections, many inconsistencies and
unanswered questions remain regarding clinical interoperability and health information
availability, access, and exchange. The model laws, then, appear to represent only a set
of general ideals and are neither a detailed implementation guide nor a mandate for
harmonization.
Finally, privacy laws must delicately balance the competing concerns of privacy and
interoperability.144 Although there is nothing new about this observation, it is perhaps
noteworthy that a balance requires a fulcrum. The problem of achieving the appropriate
balance is therefore complicated by the dynamic nature of healthcare consumerism,
which makes the fulcrum nonstationary as healthcare moves from being patient-centric
to consumer-centric and patients’ risk tolerance with respect to healthcare information
changes. On the one hand, consumerist patients will almost certainly demand that more
information about their health be retained by healthcare institutions, thereby increasing
the risk of compromising private information and suggesting tighter restrictions on its
availability.145 On the other hand, as consumerist patients become more educated and
involved in their healthcare they are also more likely to demand higher-quality
healthcare.146 This leads inexorably back to the need for greater clinical
interoperability and, concomitantly, more information exchange. This is yet another
contrarian paradox in healthcare that raises the stakes on both sides of the cost-benefit
equation. If a state legislature enacts a tough privacy law, then interoperability
becomes an issue;147 but, if the privacy law is not protective enough, then individual
privacy is more likely to be compromised.148 The problem, therefore, remains a
difficult one for which there is likely no Pareto optimal solution149 that will satisfy
everyone.
IV. WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN WE DRAW?
In the end, the solution of deconflicting federal and state privacy laws will logically
follow one of three paths. One solution is a bottom-up approach in which all states
voluntarily and multilaterally harmonize their healthcare privacy rules around some set

143. Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., The Public Health Improvement Process in
Alaska: Toward a Model Public Health Law, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 77, 114 (2000).
144. Hill et al., supra note 3, at 226–30.
145. DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 35, at 22.
146. Id.
147. See Gostin & Hodge, supra note 143, at 115.
148. See id.
149. JOEL S. DEMSKI, INFORMATION ANALYSIS 84–85 (2d ed. 1980) (“[A] group utility
assessment across two alternatives must be such that if each individual strictly prefers the first to
the second alternative, then the group assessment must strictly prefer the first to the second. This
condition is termed Pareto optimality.”) (emphasis in original).

42

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT

[Vol. 84:23

of common objectives and federal law. This seems unlikely to happen in any
reasonable timeframe given the absence of a group utility function.150 Alternatively, the
federal government could impose top-down legislation preempting state law altogether.
Given that this path would likely be fraught with political difficulties, a third approach
involving some attempt to combine federal and state law in line with Congress’s prior
intent may prove tempting. This latter approach might retain the notion of a federal
privacy law floor by both broadening and deconflicting HIPAA and then inviting states
to layer laws upon it. Although perhaps at first blush this approach seems more
appealing than either multilateral harmonization or complete federal preemption, it has
problems as well.
A major problem with harmonizing federal and state law is the narrow scope of
HIPAA Privacy Rule coverage.151 For example, HIPAA’s definition of a “covered
entity” includes health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and HCPs who transmit any
health information in electronic form in a standard transaction.152 Left out of this
definition are organizations such as employers, insurance companies other than health
insurers, and others who may encounter patient health information in the normal course
of their activities. An expansion of this definition to include all parties in possession of
patient health information would help reduce inadvertent compromises.153 If states
were left to their own volition, however, there would be no assurance that they would
create uniform definitions of covered entities.
This concern may lead to the temptation to link HIPAA and a set of federal statutes,
as contemplated in the Turning Point Act with its emphasis on patient consent as a
prerequisite for disclosure.154 In this marriage, model statutes might be designed to
work in tandem with the HIPAA Privacy Rule, filling voids such as the underinclusive definition of “covered entity” discussed in the previous paragraph. Other
voids might remain the responsibility of state legislatures, with the hope that model
statutes would drive the scope and nature of state law. The prospects for such a
compromise solution do not appear sanguine, however, inasmuch as federal and state
authorities appear to disagree with the layered approach, with some holding that
HIPAA preempts state law and others concluding that it does not.155

150. Id. (“The difficulty . . . is that no group utility assessment exists that will satisfy these
relatively innocuous requirements . . . . Requiring even modest standards of assessment, the
fancied group measure does not exist.”) (emphasis in original).
151. See Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace:
Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 360
(2007).
152. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(3) (2007).
153. Hoffman & Podgurski, supra note 151, at 360.
154. TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT § 7-101[a] (2003).
155. The Turning Point Act is supposed to work in harmony with HIPAA, but commentary
suggests that the disagreement between the state and federal authorities as to whether HIPAA
preempts state law makes a compromise solution less likely. See U.S. Dep’t Health & Human
Servs., How Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule Reduce the Potential for Conflict with State Laws?,
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaafaq/state/401.html; TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUB. HEALTH ACT
art. VII prefatory notes.
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Moreover, the danger of a federal and state law shotgun marriage becomes apparent
when one considers the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s evolution.156 After Congress passed
HIPAA, it directed HHS to submit recommendations for uniform national privacy
standards to Congress.157 When Congress failed to enact further legislation
promulgating final privacy standards, the responsibility fell to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to fill the gap.158 What resulted was the Privacy Rule, a set of
privacy regulations designed to establish a federal floor for privacy regulation such that
HIPPA does not preempt the state law as long as it imposes more stringent
requirements, standards, or implementation specifications with respect to individually
identifiable health information.159 If, however, Congress failed to act due to political
disagreement, what assurance is there that state legislatures will not emulate Congress?
Additionally, despite the intent that federal law be a floor upon which to build,
marrying federal and state laws has not turned out to be a smooth process. The HIPAA
Privacy Rule and HIPAA preemption analysis have added complexity to the resolution
of conflicts between federal and state law in some cases. Although Congress and HHS
intended the HIPAA Privacy Rule to be a floor for healthcare privacy law, it has
become more than just a floor; and its occasional conflicts with state law, if left
unresolved, could leave network architects with no choice but to use HIPAA as the
sole industry standard, despite its shortcomings.160
These considerations cast serious doubt upon the efficacy of integrating existing
laws, a doubt that is consistent with the position of at least one expert who believes that
it would be a mistake to “try and shoehorn the NHIN into the [P]rivacy [R]ule
framework.”161 The salient question, then, boils down to the following: can states be
expected to voluntarily and almost simultaneously remove these privacy law barriers
bottom-up by agreeing to harmonize through compromise, or is a top-down solution
necessary?162 Given the ponderous pace at which healthcare reform has proceeded in
the past when relying primarily on bottom-up approaches,163 it seems unlikely that
adequate incentives currently exist for a bottom-up approach to work well, despite the
national crisis. This seems especially true in light of the absence of any Pareto optimal
solution for balancing health information access against strict privacy safeguards. By
process of elimination, then, a top-down approach is seemingly the only way to remove

156. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to -8 (2000); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103–160.104, 164.502–160.503
(2007).
157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to -3.
158. See id.; 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103–160.104, 164.502–160.503.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203; see also supra text accompanying
notes 81–86.
160. Sean T. McLaughlin, Pandora’s Box: Can HIPAA Still Protect Patient Privacy Under a
National Health Care Information Network?, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 29, 53–55 (2006).
161. NCVHS Privacy Chair Sees NHIN as ‘A Chance to Rethink Everything’ in Privacy
Regulation, REP. ON PATIENT PRIVACY, July 1, 2006 (quoting Mark Rothstein, Privacy
Subcommittee Chairman of the National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, which
provides guidance to the Department of Health and Human Services).
162. See id.
163. See, e.g., Paul Starr, What Happened to Healthcare Reform?, THE AM. PROSPECT, Fall
1994, at 20, 20–31.
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the privacy law barriers delaying rapid healthcare reform.164 If a top-down approach is
needed, what latitude, if any, should be left for state law layering purposes when any
such latitude runs some risk that state law will interfere with interstate clinical
interoperability and health information exchange?
The bad news is that during the recent presidential campaign, it was not apparent
that either of the presidential candidates—whose concerns appeared to be narrowly
focused on short-term accessibility and affordability issues rather than more holistic
approaches to dealing with the healthcare crisis—appeared to grasp the full set of
problems the nation faces in achieving a high-quality healthcare system that is both
affordable and accessible by the vast majority of the populace.165 Consequently, the
presidential campaign rhetoric about healthcare reform may not be a precursor to
sweeping reform of privacy laws. Yet sweeping reform may be the only reasonably
expeditious path to remove this barrier to interstate clinical interoperability and
information exchange.
The good news is that it appears Washington is gearing up for what promises to be
another major healthcare reform effort; and, unlike the 1994 attempt, “the stars may be
aligned for Congress to make big changes.”166 Should Congress and the next
Administration decide to enact sweeping patient privacy legislation, the most viable
approach would appear to be filling the voids in existing federal laws and providing
financial incentives for state compliance that are of such magnitude that
noncompliance becomes economically unpalatable. In this vein, an analogy might be
drawn to federal highway funding, the receipt of which depends upon conformity to a
set of federal standards.167
The stakes involved with healthcare reform are very high. As two distinguished
commentators, Julius Richmond and Rashi Fein, have stated, “[t]here is a
disconcertingly large gap, more correctly a chasm, between the scientific glories of
American medicine and the delivery failures of the American health care system.”168
Moreover, “today’s health care system, the manner in which it is organized, its level of
funding, and the ways that health services are financed for and by our population are
not meeting our nation’s requirements.”169 Finally, Richmond and Fein state that: “On
the one hand we are the only [first-world] country without universal entitlement to
health care services and thus have a large number of uninsured. On the other, we spend
far more on health care, both per capita and as a percentage of GDP, than any other
country.”170

164. After all, “‘[g]erms and patients don’t really recognize state boundaries.’” Heather B.
Hayes, Doctors with Borders, GOV’T HEALTH IT, Nov. 5, 2007, at 36–37 (quoting Robert
Steffel,
CEO
of
Healthbridge),
available
at
http://www.govhealthit.com/print/4_13/rhio_report/350081-1.html.
165. Brailer, supra note 23.
166. Lori Montgomery, Writing New Prescriptions for Change, WASH. POST, June 17, 2008,
at D1.
167. See 23 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
168. RICHMOND & FEIN, supra note 13, at 1.
169. Id. at 191.
170. Id. at 232.
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We can only hope that, following the recent presidential election, politicians will
put aside partisanship, strive for a more complete grasp of the healthcare crisis, and
begin to deal meaningfully and holistically with the healthcare challenges facing the
nation—including those emanating from complicated and conflicting privacy laws.

